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Abstract: 
 
According to financial theory, in an efficient market investors reflect fully and 
instantaneously all relevant information on security prices in a way consistent with the 
economic theory. Empirical research on market efficiency investigates if there is past 
available information which can help to predict future returns profitably, as well as if 
factors not related to rational economic behaviour, influence stock prices. Financial manias 
and panics are examples which serve as obvious evidence against the efficient market 
theory. This study investigates the stock price behaviour of a number of listed banks prior 
and during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Banks under investigation were separated into 
two categories i.e. large banks and small banks. These two categories behaved differently 
under the crisis. We have serious reasons to believe that the different behaviour was not due 
to different performance or risk exposure but due to different ownership structure. Big 
banks, with high institutional participation indicated stock price dynamics during the crisis, 
possibly because of the fact that institutional investors were affected by correlated negative 
sentiment or mimicking minimising loss strategies irrespectively of the quality of the banks’ 
assets. Thus, the ownership structure of an asset may be of importance to its stock price 
behaviour contrary to the prediction of the efficient market theory.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), Fama (1970), (1976), 
asset prices reflect fully and instantaneously all relevant available information in a 
rational, i.e. in accordance with economic theory, manner and factors not linked with 
economic theory, like investors sentiment, should not affect asset prices. In an 
efficient market, past information is of no use in predicting profitably future asset 
returns, since it has been already fully reflected on asset prices by a number of 
competing, profit maximizing investors. An efficient market should react only to 
new information, but since this is unpredictable by definition, asset price changes or 
asset returns cannot be predicted. Thus, the empirical research for market efficiency 
investigates if there is past available information which can help to predict future 
returns profitably, but also investigates if non economic factors like investors’ 
psychology influence asset prices.  
In this study we will examine the stock price and trading volume behaviour 
of the banking sector in Greece, before and during the recent financial crisis which 
started in 2008. Analytically, we will examine the possibility of “causal” 
relationships between stock returns and stock returns and trading volume. The 
existence of such dynamics may give support to the view that asset prices during the 
crisis were heavily influenced by psychological factors and not only by negative 
news. We chose the banking sector because is representative for the Greek market 
but also it is preferable for investing by the majority of the institutional investors, 
both domestic and foreigner; and in the international literature there is growing 
evidence that institutional investors may herd due to psychological reasons opposite 
to the prediction of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), 
Kim and Wei (2002), Bowe and Domuta (2004), Pucket and Yan (2007), Tan, 
Chiang, Mason and Nelling (2008).   
In our study, section two (2), presents the relevant theory, section three (3), 
presents the data sets and the methodology, section four (4) presents data and the 
empirical results and finally, section five (5) concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Related Literature 
 
Under the Efficient Market Hypothesis the Fair Game2 model holds for 
stock price changes and consequently for stock returns: 
 
E[ Pt-(P*t/It-1 )]=0  or  E(rt/It-1 )=0  (1) 
 
                                               
2 The Fair Game model is derived from the Martingale model: E(Pt/It-1 )=Pt-1. According to the 
Martingale model, if the price of a stock, is a Martingale the best forecast  of  price Pt that could be 
constructed based on the available information set It-1, would just equal Pt-1, assuming that Pt-1 is in 
It-1.  
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where It-1 is the information set available at time t-1, Pt is the actual price at 
time t, P*t is the expected price which is based on the information set It-1, and Pt-P*t 
is the forecast error which is uncorrelated with variables in the information set It-1. 
Similarly, rt is the stock return which is uncorrelated with variables in the 
information set It-1, Le Roy (1989, 1990). According to  Samuelson  (1965),  under  
the assumption of a non zero equilibrium return  and   assuming  that agents have 
constant and common  time  preferences,  common probabilities and are risk neutral, 
then if  all assets are to be held willingly, as must be  the  case  for equilibrium, all 
should therefore earn the same expected rate of return, equal to the equilibrium 
return.  
Fama (1970), rejected the hypothesis that returns themselves are a Fair 
Game and proposed the following definition of market efficiency, which makes the 
EMH a joint hypothesis:  
Zt= r t -E(rt /It-1 )  (2) 
 
with:       E(zt )=E[r t-E(rt/It-1 )]=0 (3) 
 
In economic terms zt is the return at time t, in excess of the equilibrium 
expected return projected at time t, on the basis of the information set It-1. With the 
additional assumption that the equilibrium return is constant through time3, then 
returns themselves are uncorrelated with variables in past information sets.  
Research conducted in ’60s and ’70s generally supported the market 
efficiency but recent evidence however does not support the same conclusion. The 
evidence now suggests, contrary to the prediction of the efficient market model, that 
most fluctuations in stock prices can not be traced to changes in rational forecasts of 
future dividends. The recent evidence arises from two areas of research. First, 
analysts came to  realise  that  stock  returns display a variety of  systematic  
patterns,  some  kind  of anomalies, which are  difficult  to  be  explained  by  the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis. Second, analysts realised that the  same  models  
which  imply  that  returns  should  be unforecastable also imply that asset prices 
should  have  a volatility which is  low  relative  to  the  volatility  of dividends. The 
excess price volatility can be explained from the fact that investors could be reacting 
to information which is irrelevant to stock prices and that forces other than rational 
forecasts of future dividends may influence stock prices. Roll (1988) found that 
irrelevant information appeared to be of dominant importance since economic 
factors were able to explain only a small fraction of the variance in stock prices. 
Almost at the same time, Cutler et al (1989) provided evidence that stock returns are 
unrelated to news. Prior to Roll and Cutler,  Black  (1986),  in  his  presidential 
                                               
3 The assumption that the equilibrium return is constant  through  time  is  crucial  for  empirical  tests 
because as Leroy (1989) noted, "On  Fama's  definition  any capital market is efficient and no 
empirical  evidence  can possibly bear the question of market efficiency."  
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address in the American Finance Association used  the  term “noise” as a  large 
number of small  events  which  is often a causal factor much more powerful than a 
small number of large events. In this context, psychological factors may be 
considered as “noise” and psychology driven investment decisions as “noise 
trading”.  Since “noise” may influence investors’ decisions, it is realistic to assume 
that there may be a segmented asset market. Smart money i.e. investors who act 
under rational expectations may be one group; and noise traders i.e. investors who 
are influenced by factors not related to economic theory, like psychology, may be 
another group. It is also plausible to assume that the characteristics and interaction 
of these two groups may affect asset price behaviour, De Long et al (1990a,b).  
Herding defined as the act of bringing individuals together into a group 
(herd), maintaining the group and moving the group from place to place, or any 
combination of those, has been recognized in financial markets as an important 
factor of psychology based investing. It also recognized the fact that herding affects 
both groups of investors, noise traders, mostly represented by individual investors, 
as well as smart money, represented by institutional investors. Of special interest is 
whether investment decisions are correlated among institutional investors as well as 
the nature of possible factors which would make institutional investment decisions 
to be correlated. In this framework it is possible that institutional investors may herd 
with observable effect on stock prices. Research evidence based on herding 
measures, show that institutional investing follow such a herding behaviour, 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Wermers (1999), Sias (2004). 
A category of herding models imply that institutional investors receive 
correlated information or assume information from each others’ trades Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) and Hirshliefer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994). 
When institutional investors, after some trading, conclude that information is fully 
reflected on stock prices, the observed herding behaviour will pause. The above 
behaviour leads to a stock returns continuation pattern. The above herding 
behaviour, i.e. informational herds, contributes to market efficiency since allows 
stock prices to reflect quickly information and force them to converge to their 
intrinsic values, Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), Sias (2004).  
A second category of herding models assumes that institutional investors 
trade as a herd because of non informational reasons. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
present a model where institutional investors trade with the herd, mimicking one the 
other, because they do not want to act differently from other institutions taking the 
risk to fall behind their peer group. Additionally, institutional investors may herd 
due to investment fashions or because they portfolio preferences is for stocks with 
certain characteristics i.e. above average past performance or marketability, 
Banerjee (1992), Falkenstein (1996), Del Guercio (1996), Gompers and Metrick 
(2001). Finally, institutional investors may trade in herd because are affected by the 
same psychological factors, like optimism and pessimism, or even greed and fear. 
Studies have shown that institutional investors are affected psychologically by past 
returns and they buy after some price increase (optimism) and sell after some price 
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decrease (pessimism), DeLong et al (1990b). The above behaviour, when corrected, 
leads to a stock reversion pattern which in some studies is documented to be 
asymmetric, Puckett and Yan 2007. The above herding behaviour, i.e. psychological 
herding, under certain conditions may be destabilising and lead prices away from 
fundamental values, DeLong et al. (1990b).  
Institutional investing in Greece has increased dramatically over the last 
decade and especially that from abroad. Foreign Institutions in December 2007 
accounted for more than 39% of all ownership among the listed companies in 
Greece, in comparison to 19% in December 2002, according to data from the 
Central Depository of the Athens Stock Exchange. The above fact raise the question 
concerning the effect of institutional trading in the Greek stock market.  
In this study, apart from stock prices, in order to detect psychological factors 
in investment decisions, we will use trading volume since it has been recognized by 
economists as an important factor indicating investors’ interest. In some empirical 
tests for market efficiency, price changes are interpreted as the market evaluation of 
new information, while the corresponding trading volume is considered as an 
indication of the extent to which investors disagree about the meaning of the 
information, Karpoff (1987), Hiemstra and Jones (1994). Also, some researchers 
argue that trading volume may provide insights regarding the quality of trader 
information that cannot be obtained from price statistics, and the joint analysis of 
past price and volume data can prove useful in providing information about future 
price movements, Blume et al (1994). 
Early studies of the price – volume relationship discerned no relation of the 
variables under examination, Godfrey, Granger and Morgerstern (1964), Crouch 
(1970), or a contemporaneous relationship, Ying (1966), Rogalski (1978), Harris 
and Garel (1986). Nevertheless, recent international evidence, and especially 
evidence from emerging markets, gives support for “causality” relationships 
between stock returns and trading volume, but the evidence is not clear in terms of 
the involved dynamics, Moosa and Al-Loughani (1995), Silvapulle and Choi (1999), 
Lee and Rui (2000), Chordia and Swaminathan (2000),Chen et al. (2001).  
 
3.  Data sets and methodology employed 
 
In this analysis we used daily observations i.e. closing prices and trading 
volumes of shares for the banking sector of the Athens Stock Exchange. 
Analytically, we used data for the following banks:  Agrotiki Bank, Alfa Bank, 
Aspis Bank, Attikis Bank, Cyprus Bank, Emporiki Bank, Ethniki Bank, Eurobank, 
Geniki Bank, Piraeus Bank, Marfin Popular Bank, Post Office Bank. Data cover the 
time span March 2007 to March 2009; a total of 495 observations covering the 
period of the crisis March 2008-March 2009 and an equal period before the crisis, 
March 2007-March 2008. Stock prices are adjusted for dividends, stock splits and 
reverse stock splits. Finally, in all cases the logarithmic transformation of the 
original series was used. Based on Table I and according to criteria like, assets 
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value, share capital, revenues and capitalization we split the banks set into two 
categories: Big Banks (Alfa Bank, Cyprus Bank, Ethniki bank, Eurobank, Piraeus 
Bank and Marfin Popular Bank) and Small Banks (Agrotiki Bank, Aspis Bank, 
Attikis Bank, Emporiki Bank, Geniki Bank and Post Office Bank). In addition, we 
examine these two categories for a period before the financial crisis and a period 
during the financial crisis. From Table II, (see APPENDIX) based on data from the 
Central Depository of the Athens Stock Exchange, it is obvious that the Big Banks 
category has a much higher institutional participation. Finally, in order to perform 
aggregate analysis we constructed Big and Small Banks indices defined as the 
aggregate price and trading volume of the two categories under examination.  
A very popular way to test the existence of any temporal statistical 
relationship, in terms of prediction, between two variables is the Granger “causality” 
test, Granger (1969).  Granger’s tests for “causality”, in the sense of precedence, are 
based on the following statistical reasoning: if we consider two time series as Yt and 
Xt, the series Xt fails to Granger cause Yt, if in a regression of Yt on lagged Y’s and 
lagged X’s the coefficients of the latter are zero. The presence of “causality” 
obviously implies market inefficiency: Under the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), it is true that past information is of no use in predicting future stock price 
movements, that is stock price changes and consequently stock returns should be 
unpredictable in an efficient market. 
The standard Granger “causality” tests are usually performed on stationary 
data. Nevertheless, the first difference transformation, which is often used to attain 
stationarity filters out low frequency (long run) information. Cointegration 
reintroduces in a statistically acceptable way, the low frequency information.  The 
basic idea of cointegration is that when two or more series move closely together in 
the long run, even though the series themselves are trended, the difference between 
them is constant. We may regard the cointegrating series as defining a long run 
equilibrium relationship and the difference between them to be stationary. The term 
equilibrium in this case suggests a relationship which, on average, has been 
maintained by a set of variables for a long period, Engle and Granger (1987), 
Johansen and Juselius (1990). Cointegrated variables in the bi-variate case must 
possess temporal “causality” in the Granger sense, in at least one direction, since for 
a pair of series to have an attainable equilibrium, there must be some causation 
between them to provide the necessary dynamics.  
 
4.  Results  
 
The basic statistics of the series under examination are presented in Tables 
Ia and Ib (see APPENDIX). Tables IIa and IIb (see APPENDIX) presents the unit 
root test results. Analytically, we performed the Augmented Dickey -Fuller test. For 
the case of the stock prices, it is clear from the table that the null hypothesis that any 
of the series have unit roots cannot be rejected. This is confirmed by the statistics 
which test for unit roots in the first differenced series. In each case the null 
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hypothesis is easily rejected. Together with the results in the level series, it strongly 
implies that each of the stock price series are integrated of order one, I~(1). The unit 
root test statistics for the case of the trading volume series indicated that these are 
stationary at their levels i.e. they are integrated of order zero, I~(0)4. Based on the 
above results, the Granger “causality” tests can be performed on the first logarithmic 
difference of the original series.  
The results obtained from the standard Granger “causality” tests are 
presented in Tables IIIa, b, c and d. The lag selection in the above tests ensured 
white noise residuals but also the Akaike information criterion was taken in to 
account. The relevant F statistics indicate that the lagged price changes of the Big 
Banks category can help to predict the change in trading volume, with marginal 
statistical significance only in the case of the crisis period.  
Finally, cointegration tests, presented in Tables IV a, b, c and d (see 
APPENDIX) indicate that cointegration exists between the prices of the banks of the 
Big Banks category and only for the period of the financial crisis. The above result, 
lead us to conclude that there is a long run statistical equilibrium between the 
examined series i.e. individual big bank prices, during the crisis period. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The concentration of institutional ownership in equity markets raises 
important questions concerning its impact on securities prices.  International 
evidence suggests that institutions herd together particularly over short time periods, 
and that such trading behaviour may affect stock market price formation. Using data, 
(stock prices and trading volumes) for the banking sector of the Athens Stock 
Exchange, for a period before the financial crisis, which started in 2008, and during 
the crisis, we examine the existence of institutional investors correlation by 
investigating the behaviour of a group of companies with low institutional 
participation (Small Banks category) and a group with high institutional 
participation (Big Banks category). Our results indicate that there is a low frequency 
correlation phenomenon based on stock prices dynamics and stronger deviations 
from the Efficient Market Hypothesis during the period of the crisis and for the 
group of firms with high institutional participation. 
One angle to explain the results is the following. When institutional 
investors construct their portfolios, the decision to buy a particular security, out of a 
large number of possibilities that exist, is likely to convey positive firm-specific 
information which is largely uncorrelated among different firms.  Alternatively, 
when institutional investors hold a number of securities in their portfolios, and when 
short sales are constrained, as it was the case during the financial crisis period in 
                                               
4 The stationarity results of the unit root tests were confirmed be a visual inspection of the series and 
the behaviour of their sample autocorrelation function.  
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Greece, face a limited number of alternatives when deciding to sell, Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993). As a result, there are many reasons why institutional sales may 
not necessarily be driven by negative firm-specific information but are influenced by 
general factors as demand for cash, Campbell et al (2007), or negative sentiment. 
The later implies that institutional investors’ decision making is influenced by 
emotions like greed and fear.  
Based on our results we think it would be interesting to examine 
institutional investors’ behavior on a non-aggregate basis. The inclusion of variables 
like buy and sell orders by institutional investors as well as the stock price 
performance of other international exchanges would help to understand better how 
institutional investors trading may affect asset prices. We leave that for future 
research. 
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APPENDIX 
Tables and Graphs 
 
Graph I. Stock Prices (obs. 1-250 before the crisis, obs. 251-495 during the crisis) 
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Graph II. Stock Returns (obs. 1-250 before the crisis, obs. 251-495 during the crisis) 
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Graph III. Trading Volume (obs. 1-250 before the crisis, obs. 251-495 during the crisis) 
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Table I. Big and Small Banks Categorization 
Bank Institution  Assets Rank Share Capital Rank Revenues Rank Capitalisation Rank 
Agrotiki Bank Small 6,10% 6 4,91% 7 6,05% 7 5,19% 8 
Alfa Bank Big 13,74% 3 13,85% 3 14,25% 3 12,56% 3 
Aspis Bank Small 0,74% 12 0,73% 12 0,62% 12 0,23% 12 
Attikis Bank Small 0,98% 11 1,03% 10 0,94% 11 1,41% 10 
Cyprus Bank Big 7,98% 7 6,47% 6 7,11% 5 7,60% 5 
Emporiki Bank Small 6,87% 8 2,87% 8 6,32% 6 6,97% 6 
Ethniki Bank Big 22,72% 1 27,56% 1 29,06% 1 32,19% 1 
Eurobank Big 17,19% 2 17,29% 2 17,95% 2 14,05% 2 
Geniki Bank Small 1,09% 10 0,97% 11 1,08% 10 0,69% 11 
Piraeus Bank Big 11,67% 4 10,68% 5 10,41% 4 9,59% 4 
Marfin Popular Bank Big 7,60% 5 11,24% 4 4,35% 8 6,70% 7 
Post Office Bank Small 3,31% 9 2,41% 9 1,87% 9 2,83% 9 
 
 
Table II. Big and Small Banks, Institutional Investor Participation 
Big Banks 
Institutional Participation 
(approximation) Small Banks 
Institutional 
Participation  
(approximation) 
Alfa Bank 55% Agrotiki Bank 6% 
Cyprus Bank 19% Aspis Bank 8% 
Ethniki Bank 66% Attikis Bank 1% 
Eurobank 33% Emporiki Bank 21% 
Piraeus Bank 53% Geniki Bank 5% 
Marfin Popular Bank 63% Post Office Bank 30% 
Average 48% Average 12% 
 
 
Table IIIa.  Basic Statistics, period before the crisis 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Big Banks (Δ Stock Prices) -
0.007 
0.099 -0.369 7.812 
Small Banks (Δ Stock Prices) -
0.008 
0.079 -0.404 6.233 
Big Banks ( Δ Trading Volume) 0.024 2.312 -0.081 4.215 
Small Banks (Δ Trading 
Volume) 
0.029 2.411 0.065 3.263 
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Table IIIb.  Basic Statistics, period during the crisis 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Big Banks (Δ Stock Prices) -
0.034 
0.202 0.300 4.157 
Small Banks (Δ Stock Prices) -
0.026 
0.163 0.007 9.947 
Big Banks ( Δ Trading Volume) -
0.009 
2.324 -0.283 3.578 
Small Banks (Δ Trading 
Volume) 
-
0.038 
2.472 -0.313 2.743 
 
Table IVa.  Unit Root Tests, period before the crisis 
Variable Levels Δ Transformation 
Big Banks (Stock Prices) 1.07 -15.46** 
Small Banks (Stock Prices) 0.80 -16.66** 
Big Banks (Trading volume) -8.41** - 
Small Banks (Trading 
volume) 
-4.16** - 
  Note: Double star(**) indicates significance at 99 % confidence interval. 
 
 
Table IVb.  Unit Root Tests, period during the crisis 
Variable Levels Δ Transformation 
Big Banks (Stock Prices)  0.88 -14.20* 
Small Banks (Stock Prices) 0.49 -14.53* 
Big Banks (Trading volume) -2.93* - 
Small Banks (Trading 
volume) 
-3.38* - 
Note: Single star(*) indicates significance at 95 % confidence interval. 
 Double star(**) indicates significance at 99 % confidence interval. 
 
 
Table Va.  Big Banks   
Return and Volume  Granger “causality” tests, period before the crisis 
Depended Variable:  Δ Price Depended Variable:  Δ Trading Volume   «causality» direction 
“Causality” statistic:0.74 “Causality” statistic:1.15  No  “causality” 
 
 
Table Vb.  Big Banks   
Return and Volume  Granger “causality” tests, period during the crisis 
Depended Variable:  Δ Price Depended Variable:  Δ Trading Volume   «causality» direction 
“Causality” statistic:0.89 “Causality” statistic:2.62*  Δ Price “cause” Δ Trading Volume 
Note: Single star(*) indicates significance at 95 % confidence interval. 
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Table Vc.  Small Banks   
Return and Volume  Granger “causality” tests, period before the crisis 
Depended Variable:  Δ Price Depended Variable:  Δ Trading Volume   «causality» direction 
“Causality” statistic:2.33 “Causality” statistic:0.13  No  “causality” 
 
Table Vd.  Small Banks   
Return and Volume  Granger “causality” tests, period during the crisis 
Depended Variable:  Δ Price Depended Variable:  Δ Trading Volume   «causality» direction 
“Causality” statistic:1.79 “Causality” statistic:2.34  No  “causality” 
 
 
Table VIa.  Big Banks  - Stock Prices Cointegration test, period before the crisis 
Johansen cointegration statistics 
Trace results - Selected lag length, p =4   
                 Ho          Eigenvalue         Likelihood Ratio      5% Critical value 
                r = 0            0.1377                      83.99                         95.75 
 
Table VIb.  Big Banks  - Stock Prices Cointegration test, period during the crisis 
Johansen cointegration statistics  
Trace results - Selected lag length, p =4  
                 Ho          Eigenvalue         Likelihood Ratio      5% Critical value 
               r = 0             0.1729                    116.46*                      95.75 
Note: Single star(*) indicates significance at 95 % confidence interval. 
 
Table VIc:  Small Banks  - Stock Prices Cointegration test, period before the crisis 
Johansen cointegration statistics  
Trace results - Selected lag length, p =4  
                 Ho          Eigenvalue         Likelihood Ratio      5% Critical value 
               r = 0          0.1123                      81.49                      95.75  
 
Table VId.  Small Banks  - Stock Prices Cointegration test, period during the crisis 
Johansen cointegration statistics  
Trace results - Selected lag length, p =4  
                 Ho          Eigenvalue         Likelihood Ratio      5% Critical value 
               r = 0          0.1235                      74.62                      95.75  
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